This undergraduate course provides a comprehensive introduction to labor economics, examining how labor markets function, how wages are determined, and how institutions shape employment outcomes. The course draws on both theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence, with particular attention to labor market issues in developing economies.
Textbook: Borjas, G. J. Labor Economics (8th edition), McGraw-Hill.
Overview of the labor market, key facts, and the economist’s approach to understanding labor market outcomes.
The income-leisure tradeoff, reservation wages, labour force participation, and the backward-bending supply curve.
The firm’s hiring decision, marginal productivity, and labor demand under perfect competition and monopsony.
Competitive equilibrium, the cobweb model, efficiency wages, and compensating differentials.
Theory and evidence on compensating differentials, hedonic wage models, and the value of non-wage job attributes.
Schooling decisions, returns to education, the Mincer equation, on-the-job training, and signalling.
The wage structure, skill premium, discrimination models (Becker, statistical), and decomposition methods.
Unions, minimum wages, labor regulations, and their effects on employment and wages.
Informal employment in developing economies, gig/platform work, AI and automation, and the future of labor markets.
Types of unemployment, search and matching models, unemployment duration, and policy responses.
An interactive classroom game where students experience labour markets first-hand — negotiating wages as workers and making hiring decisions as employers. Six rounds, real-time wage negotiation, and a leaderboard with prizes.
Concepts covered: Labour supply (Ch. 2), labour demand (Ch. 3), market equilibrium and wage determination (Ch. 4).
You are in the town of Job Jungle. Firms produce kites and sell them at $15 each. Firms need workers to produce kites. Workers want wages. The market decides who gets hired and at what wage.
Your goal as a worker: Maximise your total earnings across 6 rounds.
Your goal as an employer: Maximise your total profit across 6 rounds.
Employers use these schedules to decide how much a worker is worth. The P x MP column is the maximum a firm should pay — any wage below this number is profitable.
| Hire # | Kites Produced | Marginal Product | P x MP ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | 8 | 8 | $120 |
| 2nd | 14 | 6 | $90 |
| 3rd | 19 | 5 | $75 |
| 4th | 22 | 3 | $45 |
| 5th | 24 | 2 | $30 |
| 6th | 25 | 1 | $15 |
| Hire # | Kites Produced | Marginal Product | P x MP ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | 5 | 5 | $75 |
| 2nd | 8 | 3 | $45 |
| 3rd | 10 | 2 | $30 |
| 4th | 11 | 1 | $15 |
| 5th | 12 | 1 | $15 |
| 6th | 12 | 0 | $0 |
Key insight: Blue workers produce more kites and are worth higher wages. The skill premium is real.
Each round lasts 7 minutes. There are 6 rounds in total.
This is your first time. Expect some chaos.
If you are a Worker:
If you are an Employer:
Rules:
By now you have a sense of the market. Wages should start converging toward the production schedule values.
Workers — think about:
Employers — think about:
Between Rounds 2 and 3 — Upgrade available — Education ($25):
Some workers are now Blue. The market splits into two segments.
Blue workers: You can now demand higher wages. The first Blue hire is worth $120 to a firm. Use this leverage.
Pink workers still Pink: Your maximum value to a firm is $75 (first hire) and drops fast. Consider upgrading between rounds if you can afford it.
Employers: You now face a choice — hire one expensive Blue worker or two cheaper Pink workers? Compare the total kites produced.
Between Rounds 3 and 4 — New upgrade — Become an Employer ($100 threshold):
New firms may have entered. More employers means more competition for workers.
Workers: More firms competing for you means stronger bargaining power. Wages may rise.
New employers: You are now hiring for the first time. Study the production schedule carefully. Do not overpay.
Existing employers: New competitors are bidding for your workers. You may need to offer better wages to keep hiring.
With more employers in the market, profit margins shrink. This is the zero-profit equilibrium from Chapter 4 in action.
Workers: The market may be near its equilibrium wage. Large gains are harder to find.
Employers: Margins are thin. Every dollar of overpayment matters. Be selective.
Last chance to earn. All cards collected at the end.
Workers: Maximise your final-round wage. No reason to hold back — there is no Round 7.
Employers: Same logic — hire profitably one last time.
After Round 6: The game ends. The instructor will display:
| Concept | How You Experience It |
|---|---|
| Diminishing marginal product | Each additional worker produces fewer kites |
| Wage = P x MP | Employers will not pay more than a worker’s marginal revenue product |
| Skill premium | Blue workers earn more because they produce more |
| Free entry | New firms enter when profits are high, driving profits down |
| Market equilibrium | Wages converge across rounds as both sides learn |
| Human capital investment | Paying $25 for education raises your future earnings |
| Unemployment and public assistance | Unhired workers receive PA — the outside option |
| Endowment inequality | Starting balances differ — does initial advantage persist? |
| Component | Weight | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Performance | 50% | Top 25%: 40–50 pts. Middle 50%: 25–39 pts. Bottom 25%: 10–24 pts. |
| Participation | 30% | Active all 6 rounds: 25–30 pts. Mostly active: 15–24 pts. Passive: 0–14 pts. |
| Rule Compliance | 20% | Default 20 pts. Deduct 5 per infraction. Cheating = automatic 0. |
Prize: Gift card to the top-earning worker and top-profit employer pair.